Revising Boilerplate: A Comparison of Private and Public Company Transactions by Choi, Stephen J. et al.
Columbia Law School 
Scholarship Archive 
Faculty Scholarship Faculty Publications 
2020 
Revising Boilerplate: A Comparison of Private and Public 
Company Transactions 
Stephen J. Choi 
New York University School of Law, stephen.choi@nyu.edu 
Robert E. Scott 
Columbia Law School, rscott@law.columbia.edu 
G. Mitu Gulati 
Duke University School of Law, gulati@law.duke.edu 





 Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons, Business Organizations Law Commons, Contracts 
s, Law and Economics Commons, Legal Profession Commons, and the Securities Law 
Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Stephen J. Choi, Robert E. Scott & G. Mitu Gulati, Revising Boilerplate: A Comparison of Private and Public 
Company Transactions, 2020 WIS. L. REV. 629 (2020). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/2577 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Scholarship Archive. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Scholarship Archive. For more 
information, please contact scholarshiparchive@law.columbia.edu. 
 
REVISING BOILERPLATE: A COMPARISON OF 
PRIVATE AND PUBLIC COMPANY TRANSACTIONS 
ROBERT E. SCOTT, STEPHEN J. CHOI, & MITU GULATI* 
 
Introduction ........................................................................................... 629 
I.   Clauses and Cases ...................................................................... 640 
II.   Data ............................................................................................ 643 
III.   Analysis...................................................................................... 646 
IV.   Implications  ............................................................................... 653 
Conclusion ............................................................................................ 655 
INTRODUCTION 
The textbook model of commercial contracts between sophisticated 
parties holds that terms are proposed, negotiated and ultimately priced by 
the parties. Parties reach agreement on contract provisions that best suit 
their transaction with the goal of maximizing the joint surplus from the 
contract. The reality, of course, is that the majority of the provisions in 
contemporary commercial contracts are boilerplate terms derived from 
prior transactions and even the most sophisticated contracting parties pay 
little attention to these standard terms, focusing instead on the price of the 
transaction.1 With standard-form or boilerplate contracts, this dynamic of 
replicating by rote the terms from prior transactions is exacerbated when 
the contract terms are reproduced largely because the same term was 
successful in closing prior deals and, even more importantly, because the 
terms are part of the market standard.2 The end result is that suboptimal 
 
*  At Columbia, NYU and Duke law schools, respectively. Thanks to Robert 
Anderson, Theresa Arnold, Sean Griffith, Caroline Gottschalk, Elisabeth de Fontenay, 
Claire Hill, Matt Jennejohn, Don Langevoort, Ann Lipton, Yaron Nili, Usha Rodrigues, 
Alan Schwartz and Glenn West for comments. Thanks also to Amanda Dixon and Madison 
Whalen for their exceptional work on the data collection front. Finally, a special thanks to 
the many lawyers who talked to us about their No Recourse contract terms. 
 1.  E.g., Barak Richman, Contracts Meet Henry Ford, 40 HOFSTRA L. REV. 77, 
79 (2011). More generally, on the ritual of copy and paste, see Claire Hill, Repetition, 
Ritual and Reputation: How do Market Participants Deal With (Some Kinds of) Incomplete 
Information, 2020 WIS. L. REV. 101. 
 2.  For discussions of this reproduction dynamic, see Julian Nyarko, Stickiness 
and Incomplete Contracting: Explaining the Lack of Forum Selection Clauses in 
Commercial Agreements (2019) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://www.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/law-economics-
studies/nyarko_stickiness.pdf [https://perma.cc/HQ6F-24MD]; see also Anna Gelpern et 
al.,, If Boilerplate Could Talk: The Work of Standard Terms in Sovereign Bond Contracts, 
44 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 617 (2019). 
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terms can persist in boilerplate contracts unchanged for decades. Indeed, 
some standardized terms in boilerplate contracts may have lost any 
recoverable meaning—thus creating what we have called a contractual 
black hole.3 Here, courts may be practically incapable of recovering a 
plausible meaning that was attached to the standard terms by the 
contracting parties at the time the contract was drafted. 
In prior research, we examined the phenomenon of stickiness of 
boilerplate terms in the specific commercial context of sovereign bond 
contracting.4 Among the more plausible reasons for the stickiness of 
standard terms in sovereign debt contracts are the presence of agency costs 
and coordination difficulties.5 Sovereign bond issuances are typically rote 
transactions where the parties driving the deal on both sides, government 
officials on the client side and investment bankers on the investor side, 
have short-term incentives to get the deals done at the cheapest front-end 
costs and are not concerned about boilerplate terms that are only relevant 
in the low probability event of default.6 These “client-side” and “investor-
side” agents are unlikely to be present when a default occurs, making the 
problems that may be caused by enforcement terms in the event of default 
even less salient at the time of contracting. In our research, we document 
that sophisticated commercial actors, even while fully cognizant that their 
contracts contained terms that subjected them to needless litigation risk, 
took years to revise those terms.7 
The agency cost problem in sovereign bond issuances implicates a 
further set of agents—the elite lawyers who negotiate and draft the 
contracts for the issuers and investors and whose ethical responsibility is 
to draft contract terms that best reflect the deal to which the parties believe 
they have agreed. In our previous work, we described the incentive of 
these “lawyer-side” agents in the following terms: The private interests of 
the elite lawyers who dominate the sovereign bond market is to process 
bond issues at the least ex ante cost and as quickly as possible, 
notwithstanding expected default costs.8 This single-minded focus on 
reducing front-end contracting costs is simply a reflection of the fact that 
the “legal terms” for which the lawyers are responsible and that form the 
standard boilerplate are seen as immaterial to both sellers and buyers in 
the initial pricing of the bonds. 
 
 3.  See Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati & Robert E. Scott, The Black Hole Problem 
in Commercial Boilerplate, 67 DUKE L.J. 1 (2017) (exploring how certain contracts are 
created and evolve over time) [hereinafter The Black Hole Problem]. 
4.  Id. 
5.  Id. at 59–66.  
6.  Id. 
 7.  See Choi, Gulati, & Scott, supra note 3.  
 8.  MITU GULATI & ROBERT E. SCOTT, THE THREE AND A HALF MINUTE 
TRANSACTION: BOILERPLATE AND THE LIMITS OF CONTRACT DESIGN 10 (2013). 
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All of the aforementioned agents viewed themselves as insulated 
from criticism as long as they utilized the standard forms. Innovation may 
be required by an exogenous shock, but any action to revise boilerplate 
was measured against the risk that the market might react negatively to a 
deviation from the market standard.9 Thus, absent some clear signal that 
there was going to be a market shift in the standard form, these agents were 
unwilling to act unilaterally. In the sovereign context, we found that when 
change finally occurred, it followed directly after a series of coordinating 
events in which senior lawyers and their clients met to discuss the 
imperative of revising the current standard form. 
In analyzing these agency cost explanations for contract stickiness, it 
is important to recognize that there are two degrees of separation between 
agents and principals in sovereign bond contracting.10 The investors and 
the citizens of the sovereign state are separated by debt managers for the 
sovereign state and investment banks for the investors, each with imperfect 
incentives to revise contracts that overtime contain suboptimal terms.11 
These agents may be subject to hyperbolic discounting: they may value 
the immediate benefits from the bond issue more than the discounted 
probability of an even more costly future default.12 These agents, however, 
are also the clients of the lawyers whose incentives to reflect their 
principals’ interests are similarly imperfect.13 Thus, the lawyers 
representing the managers may also have inadequate incentives to react to 
changes in the environment that call for revision of standard form 
contracts. The challenge, therefore, is to find environments where these 
various agency costs are significantly different, so as to isolate their 
effects. 
An important question that remains from our research on sovereign 
debt contracts, therefore, is whether contract term stickiness due to some 
combination of agency costs generalizes to other commercial settings in 
which the clients and investors are more directly engaged in monitoring 
the drafting behavior of their lawyers.14 A corollary question is the extent 
 
9.  Id. 
10.  Id. at 12–13. 
11.  See Choi, Gulati & Scott, supra note 3, at 63–65. 
12.  See id. at 60, 64. 
13.  See id. at 63. 
 14.  E.g., John F. Coyle, A Short History of the Choice-Of-Law Clause, 91 COLO. 
L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (noting that the findings from the sovereign debt research 
might not generalize). Much of the stickiness research has focused on corporate bonds. See, 
e.g., Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Standardization and Innovation in Corporate 
Contracting (or “The Economics of Boilerplate”), 83 VA. L. REV. 713 (1997); John F. 
Coyle, Choice-of-Law Clauses in Corporate Bond Indentures, 13 CAP. MKTS. L.J. 152 
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to which some coordinating mechanism is necessary to induce widespread 
change. 
To test the power of agency costs as an explanation for sticky contract 
terms, we focus on the No Recourse term, a standardized contract term 
common in commercial contracts.15 The No Recourse term in a 
commercial contract purports to prevent a party (often a creditor) holding 
a claim against a corporate entity from pursuing its claim against the 
individual assets of the shareholders, managers and other principals of the 
corporate entity.16 We compare two different commercial markets—the 
acquisition markets for private company transactions and public company 
bond deals. 
The private company deals we analyze involve concentrated and 
motivated principals, typically private equity firms, that have the expertise 
and financial incentives to focus on the language of the contract terms in 
the obligations that the firm assumes.17 The investors in private company 
deals are also highly concentrated. We posit that client-side and investor-
side agency costs are low in private company deals. Prime examples of 
private company deals are single transaction Merger and Acquisition 
contracts, and particularly those involving deals made by private equity 
firms.18 The basic rationale is that the principals in the M&A/Private 
Equity market have more at stake and are directly involved in the deals.19 
 
account/sticky.pdf [https://perma.cc/3B6T-PZDS]; Marcel Kahan & Mitu Gulati, 
Contracts of Inattention (Aug. 25, 2019) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3442355 . 
 15.  We discuss below the differing versions of this clause over time (and the 
reasons for its continued presence as part of a standard debt contract). See infra text 
accompanying notes 46–56. 
16.  Glenn West & Natalie Smeltzer, Protecting the Integrity of the Entity-
Specific Contract: The ‘No Recourse Against Others’ Clause—Missing or Ineffective 
Boilerplate, 67 BUS. LAW. 39, 40 (2011). 
17. We sourced these private company deals from the private equity contract 




 18.  John Coates’s work on M&A contracts suggests the likelihood of such 
differences across the settings. See John Coates, Why Have M&A Contracts Grown? 
Evidence From Twenty Years of Deals (Oct. 26, 2016) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2862019. 
19.  Within the field of M&A contracting itself, there is a debate over the extent 
to which contract language is primarily the product of expert lawyering or blind copy/paste 
processes. See, e.g., John Coates, Darius Palia & Ge Wu, Are M&A Contracts Value 
Relevant to Bidder and Target Shareholders? (June 2019) (unpublished manuscript) 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3201235; Robert Anderson & Jeffrey 
Manns, Boiling Down Boilerplate in M&A Agreements: A Response to Choi, Gulati & 
Scott, 67 DUKE L.J. 219 (2019).  
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As a result, their lawyer-agents pay more attention to the deal terms, 
including in particular the No Recourse term. 
Public company bond deals, on the other hand, look similar to the 
sovereign bond contracting practices we have previously examined, with 
dispersed investors on the creditor side and dispersed shareholders on the 
debtor side. One difference between public company deals and sovereign 
bond contracting is that the managers of the corporate issuers in a public 
company bond issue may benefit from the No Recourse clause. This is so 
because the clause in this case gives those managers a measure of personal 
protection from liability (a characteristic not present in the sovereign deals 
studied in our prior work). Thus, the interests of the both the principals 
and the corporate managers, the client-side agents, are more aligned 
perhaps than in the sovereign debt context. What is key for our purposes, 
however, is that there is greater dispersion of interests in the public 
company setting (and therefore greater likelihood of agency issues) than 
in the private equity setting.20 
In what follows, we compare the evolution of the No Recourse clause 
over roughly a decade and a half. This term is part of the boilerplate in 
both industries and has been subject to a number of exogenous shocks over 
this period.21 We examine whether its evolution is different in the two 
industries as a function of the exogenous shocks that hit both industries; 
shocks that have prompted calls to revise the standard No Recourse clause 
to better insulate managers and shareholders from personal liability for 
corporate obligations. 
In a November 2011 article, Glenn West and Natalie Smeltzer, 
lawyers in the private equity group at Weil, Gotshal & Manges, identified 
the contemporary relevance of the “No Recourse” provision that had been 
part of the boilerplate in corporate bond indentures since the turn of the 
20th century.22 The clause originated when shareholders under many U.S. 
state corporate laws faced the possibility of unlimited liability.23 The 
clause was an attempt to achieve limited liability via contract; a status that, 
by the middle of the last century, almost every U.S. state had provided to 
corporate entities by statute.24 By the mid 20th century, therefore, the 
clause had become largely useless and, indeed, the American Bar 
 
 20.  For a finding, in a different setting, of superior drafting in private equity 
deals, see Adam Badawi & Elisabeth de Fontenay, Contractual Complexity in Debt 
Agreements: The Case of EBITDA (June 20, 2019) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3455497. 
21.  Matthew Cain, Steven Davidoff Solomon & Antonio Macias, Broken 
Promises: The Role of Reputation in Private Equity Contracting and Strategic Default, 40 
J. CORP. L. 565 (2015). 
 22.  See generally West & Smeltzer, supra note 16. 
 23.  Id. at 41–44.  
 24.  Id. at 42–43.  
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Association’s project on model bond indentures said so.25 Yet, the drafters 
of indentures kept the clause as part of the boilerplate terms, and the ABA 
even provided a standard version of the clause to be used by the corporate 
transactional lawyers who seemed attached to it.26 As West & Smeltzer 
tell the story, a potential use for the clause emerged again in the late 20th 
century when courts around the country began to exhibit an increased 
willingness to find shareholders and managers personally liable under 
either veil piercing equitable theories or tort theories for fraudulent 
misrepresentation.27 One potential avenue of defending against these 
claims, in situations where the source of the claim was a contractual 
relationship and there was a No Recourse provision in the contract, was to 
assert that the plaintiffs had contractually agreed not to bring such claims. 
A set of cases from the late 1980s and thereafter from the federal and 
state courts in Delaware involving corporate bond indentures raised the 
issue of whether the traditional No Recourse clause barred only contract 
law claims arising out of the contract and not equitable claims (e.g., veil 
piercing) or claims arising in tort (e.g., fraud).28 Faced with the standard 
No Recourse provision that did not explicitly opt out of liability based on 
equitable and tort theories, these courts ruled that the traditional boilerplate 
No Recourse provision protected against contract-based liability only and 
not equitable or fraud claims.29 Those rulings invited speculation whether 
a non-standard No Recourse provision, tailored to explicitly disclaim 
liability for equitable and tort type claims, could have offered better 
protection for the defendants. Absent a public policy reason to constrain 
the parties from contracting out of personal liability—for example, 
instances of intentional fraud—basic principles of contract law would 
support judicial enforcement of a modified No Recourse clause that 
 
 25.  Id. at 44–57. 
26.  Id. at 56–57. 
 27.  See Peter B. Oh, Veil Piercing, 89 TEX. L. REV. 81, 107–10 (2010) 
(describing the rise in the number of veil piercing cases since the 1970s). See also David 
H. Barber, Piercing the Corporate Veil, 17 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 371 (1981); But see 
Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Veil: An Empirical Study, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1036, 
1047–50 (1991) (failing to find a trend towards an increased likelihood of courts finding 
veil piercing). 
 28.  West & Smeltzer, supra note 16, at 57–62. 
 29.  E.g., Simons v. Cogan, 549 A.2d 300 (Del. 1988) (stating that the standard 
“no recourse provision limits liability for breach of contract to Knoll, the issuing 
corporation”) (internal quotations omitted); Mabon, Nugent & Co. v. Tex. Am. Energy 
Corp., 1988 WL 5492, at *3 (Del. Ch. Jan. 27, 1988) (alter-ego claims not barred by 
standard No Recourse provision in indenture); Geyer v. Ingersoll Publ’ns Co., 621 A.2d 
784, 793–94 (Del. Ch. 1992) (standard No Recourse provision in indenture does not bar an 
alter-ego claim); U.S. Bank N.A. v. U.S. Timberlands Klamath Falls, L.L.C., 864 A.2d 930, 
950–51 (Del. Ch. 2004) (non-contractual claims not covered by “no recourse” provision); 
LaSalle Nat’l Bank v. Perelman, 141 F. Supp. 2d 451, 463 (D. Del. 2001) (No Recourse 
clause does not cover non-contract claims). 
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excluded equitable and fraud claims. Further, standard theory would 
predict that lawyers drafting bond indentures would adjust to these 
decisions and revise their clauses to better protect their clients on the issuer 
side. 
In a second set of cases from the mid-1990s to mid-2000s involving 
commercial contracts with limited liability provisions, the courts held (or 
suggested) that a standard No Recourse clause could indeed protect against 
more than pure contract claims; particularly if the tort or equitable claims 
arose out of the contractual relationship.30 These cases were from several 
different jurisdictions (including California, Wisconsin, Illinois and 
Hawaii) and provided further support for the foregoing conjecture. None 
of these cases involved a No Recourse clause that explicitly disclaimed 
liability for a broader set of circumstances than simply contract claims. 
Instead, the courts were willing to read the clauses broadly, unlike the 
courts in Delaware and New York. Nevertheless, the lesson of the cases is 
that a No Recourse clause drafted to explicitly disclaim the broader types 
of liability was likely to provide more protection for issuers than one 
drafted narrowly. 
These cases eventually led lawyers at a number of firms, including 
Weil Gotshal and Gibson Dunn, to urge their clients and colleagues 
concerned about shareholder and managerial liability to revise their No 
Recourse clauses.31 We treat the time periods when there was increased 
pressure for revision as the shocks that drove change in contract language 
 
 30.  E.g., Laeroc Waikiki Parkside, L.L.C. v. K.S.K. (Oahu) L.P., 166 P.3d 961, 
984 (Haw. 2007) (holding that a No Recourse clause can waive tort claims as long as it 
was knowingly made and was not unconscionable); Farnham v. Superior Court, 70 Cal. 
Rep. 2d 85, 91 (Ct. App. 1997) (concluding that a limited liability provision protecting 
corporate employer worked to bar tort claim for defamation, among other claims); Hoosier 
Energy v. Amoco Tax Leasing, 34 F.3d 1310, 1316 (7th Cir. 1994) (finding that a No 
Recourse provision served as an effective protection against claims of unjust enrichment). 
See also West & Smeltzer, supra note 16, at Section V (C) (discussing these cases). 
 31.  In addition to West & Smeltzer, supra note 16, at 70, see Andrew Cheng et 
al. (Gibson Dunn & Crutcher), Lender Protections in Purchase Agreements: Negotiating 
Xerox Provisions, Strafford (Feb. 16, 2017), 
http://media.straffordpub.com/products/lender-protections-in-purchase-agreements-
negotiating-xerox-provisions-2017-02-16/presentation.pdf [https://perma.cc/K384-XF76]. 
For additional discussions of the so-called “Xerox Provisions,” which included efforts to 
limit lender liability along the lines suggested by West & Smeltzer, supra note 16, see also 
Troy Ungerman (Norton Rose Fulbright), Money Makes the World Go Round: Lender 
Protections in Leveraged Acquisitions, DEAL LAW WIRE BLOG (Aug. 31 2016), 
https://www.deallawwire.com/2016/08/31/money-makes-the-world-go-round-lender-
protections-in-leveraged-acquisitions/ [https://perma.cc/7JU8-VVXV]; DAVIS POLK, 
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in the market. The precise dates of when lawyers became concerned with 
these matters is unclear, but four possibilities stand out. 
First, from a traditional contract law perspective, where lawyers are 
assumed to be reading judicial opinions and revising their contracts in 
response to the emerging case law, we would expect to see changes in 
contract language to appear starting in the 1990s. We refer to this as the 
“mid-1990s Case Law shock.” 
Second, experts in the field such as Steven Davidoff Solomon and 
Glenn West suggest that contract drafters in the private equity market 
began paying particular attention to the standard form in 2005–06 because 
of a set of important transactions and not because of any particular case 
outcomes. These two transactions, referred to in the industry as the 
“SunGard” and “Neiman Marcus” transactions, involved one of the first 
prominent instances of private equity sponsors providing a limited 
guaranty that a deal would go through (the “reverse termination fee”).32 
Previously, private equity sponsors had structured the deal to insulate 
themselves from liability. But the increasing demand from the market for 
reverse termination fees—guarantees that quickly became commonplace 
after the SunGard and Neiman Marcus transactions—focused private 
equity sponsors on the possibility that they might be held personally liable 
for amounts greater than the termination fee.33 West writes, on the Weil 
Gotshal blog: 
Indeed, before the SunGard and Neiman Marcus transactions in 
2005, not only was the acquisition vehicle the only party to the 
purchase and sale agreement, but there was no limited guaranty 
signed by the sponsor standing behind the reverse break fee. 
Indeed, there was no reverse break fee to stand behind and there 
was typically a funding out if the lenders did not fund the debt 
financing set forth in the debt commitment letter. And to 
mitigate any claims of piercing (however inappropriate they 
would have been), there developed a standard non-recourse 
provision that contractually bound the seller not to seek recourse 
 
 32.  For a description of the SunGard transaction, see STEVEN M. DAVIDOFF, 
GODS AT WAR: SHOTGUN TAKEOVERS, GOVERNMENT BY DEAL AND THE PRIVATE EQUITY 
IMPLOSION 37–39 (2009) (noting the use of a “no-recourse” aspect of the guarantee in the 
SunGard transaction and the rapid change in industry practice towards the use of these 
reverse termination fees after 2005 from about ten percent of the deals in 2005 to eighty 
percent by 2008). 
 33.  West & Smeltzer, supra note 16, at 66; See Glenn D. West, Sungard and 
Neiman Marcus LBO Transactions—Increased Liability Risk to Private Equity Sponsors?, 
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against the sponsor. That non-recourse provision is now 
incorporated into the limited guaranty of the sponsor, with a 
proviso that actually voids the guaranty if the seller seeks 
recourse against the sponsor for more than the guaranteed 
reverse break fee. A non-recourse provision is now not always 
set forth in the purchase and sale and agreement, but only in the 
limited guarantee. But the better practice is for it to appear in 
both.34 
 
 We refer to the 2005 and 2006 transactions as the “2005–2006 
Transaction Shock.” 
 Third, prior research suggests that changes to standard form 
boilerplate occur in bursts when big negative financial events focus 
the attention of drafters on the need to produce a new standard form.35 
A possible explanation here is that these negative events produce 
increased litigation because investors try to exit deals and their 
counterparts respond by suing for breach of contract. That type of 
litigation causes investors to focus on limiting their liability in the 
future. Based on this story, we would expect to see changes in the 
wake of the 2008 financial crisis that occurred during the period of 
our dataset.36 We refer to the impact of the financial crisis as the 
“2008 Financial Crisis Shock.” 
 Fourth, in late 2011, attorneys Glenn West and Natalie Smeltzer 
published an article in the Business Lawyer, likely the most widely 
circulated business law publication in the country, on the pressing 
need to revise the No Recourse term.37 Between late 2010 and early 
2012, West also spoke at a series of corporate counsel and bar 
association meetings about the need for revision.38 
 
 34.  See Glenn D. West, Protecting the Private Equity Firm and its Deal 
Professionals from the Obligations of its Acquisition Vehicles and Portfolio Companies, 
WEIL GLOBAL PRIVATE EQUITY WATCH (May 23, 2016), 
https://privateequity.weil.com/features/protecting-private-equity-firm-deal-professionals-
obligations-acquisition-vehicles-portfolio-companies/ [https://perma.cc/KUD6-C3TS]. 
 35.  Generally, on the impact of large crises on contract change, see Stephen J. 
Choi, Mitu Gulati & Eric A. Posner, The Evolution of Contract Terms in Sovereign Bonds, 
4 J. LEGAL ANAL. 131 (2012). 
 36.  For a discussion of the impact of the 2007–08 crisis on the private equity 
contract, see Matthew D. Cain et al., Broken Promises: The Role of Reputation in Private 
Equity Contracting and Strategic Default, 40 J. CORP. L. 565 (2015).  
 37.  West & Smeltzer, supra note 16.  
 38.  According to information we obtained from West, there were at least five 
corporate counsel/CLE/bar association events at which he spoke on this topic between late 
2010 and early 2012. E-mail from Glenn West to authors (Oct. 4 & Oct. 9, 2019) (on file 
with authors). Further, the West/Smeltzer article received a Burton award for the article. 
Law360 Distinguished Legal Writing Awards–Law Firm (2012), THE BURTON AWARDS, 
https://www.burtonawards.com/winners/law360-distinguished-legal-writing-award-
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In sum, there are four events in the market that should, in theory, have 
induced attorneys to contemplate revising the No Recourse boilerplate. 
We use these four events to ask whether differences in identifiable agency 
costs affect the rate of change in the No Recourse contract term in private 
equity and public debt deals. To conduct this preliminary inquiry, we 
collected data on over six hundred transactions during the period January 
1, 2005 to June 1, 2019 for public and private company deals that 
contained No Recourse clauses. 
We found that the market universally followed a single standard No 
Recourse clause at the beginning of our dataset in 2005 that did not address 
the possibility of equity or fraud claims. We term this standard clause the 
“Old” clause. We found that the Old clause continued to dominate in 
public company deals through the entire time period of our dataset from 
2005 to mid–2019 (although there were some versions of the No Recourse 
clause in public deals that did address equity and fraud claims that we 
discuss below as “Modified” clauses and “New” clauses). In contrast, we 
observed a dramatic shift away from the Old clause and toward the 
Modified and New clauses for private company deals after 2012. 
In addition to testing whether the combined effects of agency costs 
from all sources matter for the rates of revision in boilerplate contract 
terms, we also attempt to isolate the impact of lawyer-side agency costs. 
Why should we expect to find that lawyers in commercial markets have 
inadequate incentives to revise boilerplate terms when external shocks 
negatively affect their clients’ interests? In prior work, we found evidence 
suggesting that lawyers drafting sovereign debt contracts face a first-
mover disadvantage in proposing revisions to standard boilerplate 
language.39 Lawyers are reluctant to change the language in standard terms 
because they cannot draft an entirely risk-free alternative to the current 
boilerplate language.40 Among other things, they have greater uncertainty 
about how courts will respond to the changes they do make.41 Thus, in the 
case of the No Recourse clause, changing the contract term by clarifying 
 
winners-law-firms/ [https://perma.cc/FX8G-29D7]. Finally, the article with Smeltzer was 
published in the Business Lawyer, the journal of the American Bar Association, a copy of 
which goes to every member of the business law section and likely makes is the most 
widely circulated law journal. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, The Business Lawyer, 
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/business_law/publications/the_business_lawyer/ 
[https://perma.cc/6P8Q-7BXV]. The revised clause that West and Smeltzer recommend in 
their November 2011 article was also subsequently (albeit in 2013) recommended as part 
of a package of reforms by the New York Bar Association. THE CORP. LAW COMM. OF THE 
ASS’N OF THE BAR OF N.Y.C., SAMPLE CONTRACT BOILERPLATE 18 (2013), 
https://www2.nycbar.org/pdf/report/uploads/SampleContractBoilerplate-March2013.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9RCN-PYH9]. 
39.  Choi, Gulati, & Scott, The Black Hole Problem, supra note 3, at 6, 14. 
40.  Id. at 8–9. 
 41.  GULATI & SCOTT, supra note 8, at Chapter 7. 
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that the clause is explicitly intended to insulate shareholders and managers 
from all sources of liability might put unrevised clauses in prior contracts 
at greater risk of failing to protect against liability because of the absence 
of the new clarification. These “legacy contracts” costs increase as does 
market uncertainty: until the term is tested in litigation, there is greater 
uncertainty over how courts will interpret both the revised and original 
versions of the clause in question. In consequence of this heightened 
uncertainty, lawyers have greater reluctance to revise their clients’ terms 
unilaterally. Changing a term poses the risk that the standard indenture 
will now be viewed as idiosyncratic, thus increasing learning costs.42 
In prior work, we found that lawyers and other drafters can overcome 
these agency costs by coordinating on a change to the boilerplate that 
affects a large portion of the contracts that are issued after the external 
shock.43 The first-mover-disadvantage hypothesis thus predicts that these 
revisions will not occur in a significant way until the market participants 
can solve their collective action problem and coalesce around a new 
industry standard.44 While inertia costs for individual actors remains high, 
once the collective forms the costs are significantly diminished.45 To see 
whether the costs of coordination for drafting lawyers are correlated with 
contractual stickiness, we look both at the effect of coordinating events—
such as the various bar association and continuing legal education (CLE) 
events led by attorney Glenn West in late 2011—and at private company 
deals where client-side and investor-side agency costs are low. We 
compare those private company deals where at least one of the law firms 
associated with the private company deals was one of the top five ranked 
private equity law firms, indicating that law firms of sufficient size have 
the economies of scale to play a key role in modifying the market standard 
in the commercial contract setting compared with private company deals 
without such a law firm. We find both that the rate of revision in contract 
language changes significantly after the coordinating events and that there 
is a greater rate of revision in boilerplate terms for private company deals 
involving a top five ranked private equity law firm (consistent with lower 
coordination costs). 
The remainder of the article proceeds as follows. Part I briefly 
describes the different types of No Recourse clauses and the relevant cases 
that suggest the benefits of revising the traditional version of the clause. 
Part II describes our tests and the data sources we used. Part III reports on 
the results of the tests. Part IV discusses implications. Part V concludes. 
 
 42.  Id. 
 43.  Choi, Gulati & Scott, The Black Hole Problem, supra note 3, at 14, 59–61. 
44.  Id. at 14, 59. 
45.  Id. at 14. 
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I. CLAUSES AND CASES 
The No Recourse provision in the early part of the 20th century was 
important because many states did not limit liability for equity holders in 
corporations but did allow parties to opt contractually for limited 
liability.46 An example of the standard opt out No Recourse clause, from 
a 1927 case, reads as follows: 
No recourse under or upon any obligation, covenant, or 
agreement of this indenture, or of any purchase-money bond or 
coupon, or because of the creation of any indebtedness hereby 
secured, shall be had against any incorporator, stockholder, 
officer, or director of the company or any successor corporation, 
either directly or through the company, by the enforcement of 
any assessment or by any legal or equitable proceeding by virtue 
of any statute or otherwise. This indenture and the purchase 
money bonds are solely corporate obligations, and no personal 
liability whatever shall attach to or be incurred by the 
incorporators, stockholders, officers, or directors of the 
company, or any successor corporation, or any of them, because 
of the incurring of the indebtedness hereby authorized, or under 
or by reason of any of the obligations, covenants, or agreements 
contained in this indenture, or in any of the purchase-money 
bonds or coupons, and any and all personal liability either at 
common law or in equity, or by statute or Constitution, of every 
such stockholder, officer, or director, is released and waived as 
a condition of and as part of the consideration for the execution 
of this indenture and the issue of the purchase-money bonds.47 
This version of the No Recourse clause (that we designate as the 
“Old” clause) was a standard feature of bond indentures from the turn of 
the century until the 1960s.48 From the 1960s onward, the drafters of the 
Model Indenture Provisions continued to revise the language of the Old 
clause, ultimately reducing its length substantially, first in 1983 and then 
in 2000, to the following forms that, importantly, did not explicitly address 
the possibility of equity or fraud claims: 
 
 46.  See United States v. Stanford, 70 F. 346, 363 (9th Cir. 1895), aff’d, 161 U.S. 
412 (1896); Preston v. Howell, 257 N.W. 415 (Iowa 1934). See also Note, The “No 
Recourse” Provision in Corporate Bonds and Indentures, 34 COLUM. L. REV. 107, 109–10 
(1934).  
 47.  Small v. Sullivan, 157 N.E. 261, 264–65 (N.Y. 1927).  
 48.  See West & Smeltzer, supra note 16, at Sections III & IV (drawing from the 
case law in telling their story of the evolution of this clause). 
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All liability described in the Securities of any director, officer, 
employee or stockholder as such, of the Company, is released.49 
(1983 version) 
and 
A director, officer, employee or stockholder, as such, of the 
Company shall not have any liability for any obligations of the 
Company under the Securities or the Indenture or for any claim 
based on, in respect of or by reason of such obligations or their 
creation.50 (2000 version). 
We designate all these versions of the No Recourse clause as the Old 
clause because they lack any reference to claims based in equity or fraud. 
The core of all variants of the Old clause is that the language does not 
explicitly bar veil piercing claims or other non-contractual claims against 
the principals and managers of the corporation.51 
The first publicly discussed version of the No Recourse clause that 
addressed equity and fraud claims was proposed by West and Smeltzer in 
their 2011 Business Lawyer article.52 They drafted a new version of the 
No Recourse clause explicitly designed to exclude all potential sources of 
personal liability for principals and managers.53 In our data, we code 
instances of the West-Smeltzer clause as the “New” clause. It reads as 
follows: 
[Except to the extent otherwise set forth in the other Transaction 
Documents], [a]ll claims, obligations, liabilities, or causes of 
action (whether in contract or in tort, in law or in equity, or 
granted by statute) that may be based upon, in respect of, arise 
under, out or by reason of, be connected with, or relate in any 
manner to this Agreement, or the negotiation, execution, or 
performance of this Agreement (including any representation or 
warranty made in, in connection with, or as an inducement to, 
this Agreement), may be made only against (and are those solely 
of) the entities that are expressly identified as parties in the 
preamble to this Agreement (“Contracting Parties”). No Person 
who is not a Contracting Party, including without limitation any 
director, officer, employee, incorporator, member, partner, 
manager, stockholder, affiliate, agent, attorney, or representative 
of, and any financial advisor or lender to, any Contracting Party, 
 
49.  Model Simplified Indenture, 38 BUS. LAW. 741, 772 (1983). 
50.  Revised Model Simplified Indenture, 55 BUS. LAW. 1115, 1163 (2000). 
 51.  E.g., Simons v. Cogan, 549 A.2d 300 (Del. 1988); LaSalle Nat’l Bank v. 
Perelman, 82 F. Supp. 2d 279 (D. Del. 2000). 
52.  West & Smeltzer, supra note 16. 
53.  Id. at 71–72. 
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or any director, officer, employee, incorporator, member, 
partner, manager, stockholder, affiliate, agent, attorney, or 
representative of, and any financial advisor or lender to, any of 
the foregoing (“Nonparty Affiliates”), shall have any liability 
(whether in contract or in tort, in law or inequity, or granted by 
statute) for any claims, causes of action, obligations, or 
liabilities arising under, out of, in connection with, or related in 
any manner to this Agreement or based on, in respect of, or by 
reason of this Agreement or its negotiation, execution, 
performance, or breach; and, to the maximum extent permitted 
by law, each Contracting Party hereby waives and releases all 
such liabilities, claims, causes of action, and obligations against 
any such Nonparty Affiliates. Without limiting the foregoing, to 
the maximum extent permitted by law, (a) each Contracting 
Party hereby waives and releases any and all rights, claims, 
demands, or causes of action that may otherwise be available at 
law or in equity, or granted by statute, to avoid or disregard the 
entity form of a Contracting Party or otherwise impose liability 
of a Contracting Party on any Nonparty Affiliate, whether 
granted by statute or based on theories of equity, agency, 
control, instrumentality, alter ego, domination, sham, single 
business enterprise, piercing the veil, unfairness, 
undercapitalization, or otherwise; and (b) each Contracting 
Party disclaims any reliance upon any Nonparty Affiliates with 
respect to the performance of this Agreement or any 
representation or warranty made in, in connection with, or as 
an inducement to this Agreement.54 
There is a substantial amount of new language in the West-Smeltzer 
clause. The particularly important additional provisions are the waiver of 
rights language and the sentences that explicitly mention agency theory, 
alter ego, piercing the corporate veil, and so on. The clause also specifies 
at the outset that liability—to the extent it is permitted—is only against 
those expressly named as contracting parties. This adds clarity to the older 
version that would designate those with liability as “the undersigned.” 
We also code for other instances we observed where the No Recourse 
clause is revised to address some of the new liability issues dealing with 
equity and fraud claims, but not as extensively as the West-Smeltzer 
version. We designate these as the “Modified” versions of the clause. 
Below, is an example of a Modified clause from a 2018 Stock Purchase 
agreement that specifies that there is no liability in “contract, tort, equity 
or otherwise”, but has no explicit disclaimers with respect to veil piercing, 
alter ego, etc.: 
 
 54.  Id. (emphasis added). 
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This Agreement may only be enforced against, and any action, 
suit, claim, investigation, or proceeding based upon, arising out 
of or related to this Agreement may only be brought against, the 
Persons that are expressly named as parties to this Agreement. 
Except to the extent named as a party to this Agreement, and 
then only to the extent of the specific obligations of such parties 
set forth in this Agreement, no past, present or future 
shareholder, member, partner, manager, director, officer, 
employee, Affiliate, agent or Advisor of any party to this 
Agreement or any Subsidiary of the Company will have any 
liability (whether in contract, tort, equity or otherwise) for any 
of the representations, warranties, covenants, agreements or 
other obligations or liabilities of any of the parties to this 
Agreement or for any action, suit, claim, investigation, or 
proceeding based upon, arising out of or related to this 
Agreement.55 
In contrast to the New clause, the Modified clause lacks explicit 
disclaimers with respect to veil piercing, alter ego and the other versions 
of claims of that type. Given the tendency of courts, particularly in 
Delaware, to read these clauses narrowly and from a formalist perspective, 
the absence of a clear indication that the drafters wished for a different 
meaning supports the inference that this clause is less protective of the 
principals and managers than the West and Smeltzer version.56 
II. DATA 
We report the results of our inquiry into the relevance of coordination 
costs as an explanatory variable of both managerial and lawyer-side 
agency costs. Specifically, we report on changes to boilerplate No 
Recourse terms in the private company and public company setting. Our 
results are preliminary, and we only focus on top level results in this 
article. We hope to expand on these tests in a later study to take into 
account, among other factors, how the differences we observe vary by 
industry and the specific type of commercial contract. We also do not 
attempt to parse the deals as a function of which specific parties associated 
with the private or public company transactions benefit from the use of a 
New or Modified No Recourse provision. As an aside, our interviews with 
 
 55.  Stock Purchase Agreement Byland Among Leggett & Platt, Incorporated, 




 56.  For a discussion of the Delaware cases, see West & Smeltzer, supra note 16, 
at 57–62. 
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lawyers who work on these deals suggests that the No Recourse provision 
is almost never the subject of negotiation. To the extent the language in 
the transaction changes, it is because the key firms involved in the 
transaction have changed the standard documents used in the transaction. 
For our dataset, we collect a sample of public and private company 
deals from January 1, 2005 to June 1, 2019, that contained No Recourse 
clauses. We adopt a particular definition of a public company: if a 
company had stock listed on a national securities exchange, such as the 
New York Stock Exchange or Nasdaq, we counted it as a public 
company.57 And if it did not, that was categorized as a private company. 
We chose this particular definition of a public company because exchange-
listed companies are more likely to have a dispersed shareholder base. In 
contrast, for companies not listed on an exchange, there are likely to be 
more concentrated owners, including often private equity firms, who will 
be better able to monitor their legal agents. 
We assembled our dataset using two primary sources for the January 
1, 2005 to June 1, 2019 period: (1) Westlaw’s What’s Market database 
which has compiled M&A deals from 2010–19; (2) Bloomberg’s SEC 
EDGAR database of exhibits attached to company 8-K filings, that we 
used for the 2005–10 period. The types of contracts contained in Westlaw 
and Bloomberg were Bond Indentures, Purchase and Sale Agreements, 
Stockholders Agreements, Trust Agreements, and Revolving Credit 
Agreements. While we leave to future research the examination of whether 
the dynamics of sticky boilerplate varies across these different categories 
of contracts, we believe that the key factors for the rate of revision and 
updating of the relevant contract term are (a) whether the company 
involved is private or public, which will affect the overall level of agency 
costs (particularly client and investor-side agency costs) and (b) whether 
there is an actor—such as a law firm that does extensive business in such 
contracts—that is able to function as a “spider” to coordinate the loose 
web of relationships among individual lawyers who otherwise may resist 
unilaterally revising boilerplate language, thereby reducing attorney-side 
agency costs.58 Once these two factors are taken into account, we believe 
 
 57.  All of these equity listings were from US exchanges. 
 58.  These informal relationships are commonly known as networks. Networks 
are mechanisms for coordination and cooperation between interdependent entities who 
operate in multilateral markets. Some networks deploy contractual mechanisms—whether 
in the form of a master contract as in the case of a franchise or a manufacturing supply 
chain, or a bureaucratic structure in the case of trade associations—that support network 
collaborations. These relationships have a “spider in the web”—a controlling entity or 
hierarchy at the center of the network that facilitates network formation and coordination. 
For further discussion, see Ariel Porat & Robert E. Scott, Can Restitution Save Spiderless 
Networks, 8 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 1 (2018); see also Stephen J. Choi & Mitu Gulati, 
Innovation in Boilerplate Contracts, 53 EMORY L. J. 930 (2004) (reporting on the impact 
of industry dominant law firms in leading change to boilerplate contracts). 
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that other factors, such as the type of contract, will affect the rate of change 
only marginally if at all. 
From both databases we assembled a roughly equal number of 
randomly selected contracts with No Recourse provisions that covered 
roughly the same time periods for both private and public company 
transactions. In a number of these transactions, both public and private 
companies were involved. If one of the parties involved was private, we 
categorized the transaction as a private company transaction. For each 
transaction, we collected data on the type of No Recourse provisions, the 
deal amount, the deal type and the lawyers involved. To the extent the data 
we found from the foregoing sources was incomplete, we supplemented it 
with data from the Filings Expert database. 
The contracts we obtained fall into two categories. The first category 
of contracts is “one-and-done” contracts for a single transaction. The 
second category of contracts is contracts that were part of a sequence of 
contracts for a single issuer raising capital across multiple transactions (we 
term these “repeat contracts”). We removed those repeat contracts that are 
part of a sequence that commenced prior to 2005. The following table 
reports the number of contracts for private company and public company 
transactions by year. 
 
Table: Number of Private and Public Company Transactions by Year 
 
Year Private Public Total 
2005 15 14 29 
2006 14 17 31 
2007 13 17 30 
2008 27 22 49 
2009 19 21 40 
2010 18 17 35 
2011 25 32 57 
2012 20 21 41 
2013 29 17 46 
2014 31 23 54 
2015 26 23 49 
2016 18 17 35 
2017 19 22 41 
2018 21 30 51 
2019 18 29 47 
Total 313 322 635 
 
In total, we collected data on 635 transactions, of which 313 involved 
a private company and 322 involved a public company. 
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III. ANALYSIS 
Our empirical strategy utilizes four shocks that could trigger a 
revision in the No Recourse clause that takes into account the exogenous 
events that had transpired—the mid-1990s Case Law Shock, the 2005–
2006 Transaction Shock, the 2008 Financial Crisis shock, and the 2011 
publication of the West/Smeltzer article and series of bar association/CLE 
presentations that occurred around that time where the need to revise the 
clause was discussed. We test whether agency cost differences owing to 
differences in the costs of monitoring and coordination between private 
company and public company transactions affect the rate of change of the 
contract term in the market. 
Because our dataset runs from 2005 to mid-2019, we are unable to 
compare high versus low agency cost deals to test the mid-1990s Case Law 
shock. Prior to the time period of our dataset, Westlaw and Bloomberg as 
early as 1987 had reported a small number of contracts containing a No 
Recourse clause. However, the number of deals per year was sparse, with 
many years having either few or no transactions, indicating that Westlaw 
and Bloomberg did not comprehensively cover such contracts prior to 
2005. Our understanding from talking to representatives at 
Westlaw/Bloomberg, however, is that the coverage significantly increased 
starting in 2005 and attempts to be comprehensive from 2010 onward.59 
There were seven transactions that we could find from prior to 2005, 
ranging from 1987 to 2003. All seven were private company transactions 
and all used the Old version of the No Recourse clause. 
Based on this limited sample of transactions from before 2005, we 
find no evidence that the first shock, the mid-1990s Case Law shock, in 
and of itself caused the market to react by inducing revisions in the No 
Recourse clause for either private or public company transactions. While 
we do not know why our data sources contain only a small number of 
offerings prior to 2005, we have no reason to believe that the observations 
in the dataset prior to 2005 are not representative of the No Recourse 
clause in use during the pre-2005 time period.60 Moreover, the universal 
usage of the Old clause in 2005, the first year of our dataset, supports the 
prevalence of the Old clause prior to 2005 (see Figures 1 and 2). Further, 
as noted earlier, the private equity contract literature reports that No 
Recourse provisions became important in that industry starting in 2005 
 
 59.  Importantly, from 2005 to 2010, where the data coverage is not as 
comprehensive as that from 2010 onwards, there does not appear to be any bias in the 
subset of contracts that were scraped from SEC filings that would impact our results. 
 60.  Our understanding from conversations with representatives at the data 
sources is that they are attempting to back fill documents from dates prior to 2005, but that 
this document collection is not an immediate priority given the lack of customer demand 
for older documents. 
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with the increased use of the reverse termination fee.61 That said, from the 
limited pre–2005 data that we have, it appears that changes in case law 
alone were not sufficient to drive changes in boilerplate commercial 
contract terms.  
To test the importance of overall agency costs in the rate of revision 
of contract terms, we utilize the 2005–2006 Transaction shock, the 2008 
Financial Crisis shock and the 2011 West/Smeltzer article together with 
the CLE/bar association meetings. For each shock, we examine when New 
and Modified clauses appeared in the market for private versus public 
company deals. Figure 1 displays the mixture of the three types of No 
Recourse clauses (Old, New, and Modified) for each year from 2005 to 
2019 for public company deals, including repeat contracts that are part of 
a sequence of contracts by the same issuer. 
 
Note from Figure 1 that both the New and Modified clause are used 
in a minority of the public company deals starting in 2006. In no single 
year, however, are the New and Modified clauses either separately or in 
aggregate present in more than thirty-five percent of the transactions. 
In comparison, Figure 2 displays the mixture of the three types of No 
Recourse clauses for year from 2005 to 2019 for private company deals, 
including repeat contracts that are part of a sequence of contracts by the 
same issuer. Note that unlike the public company deals, homogeneity 
exists in the market until 2009—only the Old clause is used in the 
transactions.62 From 2010, we see the introduction of the Modified clause 
 
 61.  See DAVIDOFF, supra note 32, at 37–39. 
 62.  That said, the caveat here is that Figure 2 only reports on what we found in 
our dataset. We do know from private equity literature that some of the deals have had 
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in a fraction of the deals. Then in 2012, we see both the introduction of the 
New clause (the clause recommended by the West/Smeltzer article in 
November 2011) and a rapid increase in the prevalence of both the New 
and Modified clauses, ultimately constituting a majority of the private 
company deals after 2012.  
While there is some use of New and Modified clauses for public 
company deals, the use of these terms was sporadic for public company 
deals and never approached a majority usage in the market for any year in 
our sample period. Private company deals experienced a much different 
pattern. There appeared to be greater stickiness in the market prior to 2010 
compared with public company deals, with 100% of the deals using the 
Old clause. Then in 2010 and 2011, we see a slight shift toward use of the 
Modified clause followed by a dramatic rise of both Modified and New 
clauses in 2012 and onward, accounting for roughly half of the clauses 
from 2012 to mid 2019. From 2012, the New or Modified clause is present 
in 52.5% of the private company transactions compared with only 22.3% 
of the public company transactions for the same time period (chi-squared 
test of the difference is significant at the 1% confidence level). 
The patterns we observe in Figures 1 and 2 are consistent with the 
lower overall agency costs in private company deals resulting in greater 
incentives on the part of contracting parties after the coordinating events 
of the various bar association meetings discussing the need to revise this 
clause in late 2011. While neither the changes in case law in the mid-1990s 
nor the SunGard and Neiman Marcus transactions in 2005–2006 nor the 
 
revised their clauses as early as 2005 (including in the famous SunGard transaction, see 
supra note 32), but we did not use those deal documents since they had not shown up in 
our data set. 
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financial crisis in 2008 were enough to spur widespread change, the 
publication of the West/Smeltzer article and the various bar 
association/CLE events does appear to drive change, in particular in the 
context of private company transactions. Where agency costs are greater, 
however, as for public company deals, the publication of the 
West/Smeltzer article and the CLE/bar association meetings do not result 
in a major change in the No Recourse clause. For public company deals, 
there is a small shift toward the New and Modified clause from 2006 
onward, but the market remains predominantly stuck on the Old clause up 
to the end of our study in mid-2019. In comparison, private company deals, 
with lower agency costs, shift later, only after the coordinating events of 
late 2011. Once the shift occurs, however, the market moves quickly, with 
the New and Modified clause together constituting roughly half of the 
clauses in new deals from 2012 onward. 
One issue with our comparison of private company and public 
company transactions in Figures 1 and 2 is that many of the contracts were 
from repeat transactions by the same corporate entity. We observed 
extreme stickiness in the No Recourse clause in these repeat contracts. For 
private company transactions, 109 of the 313 contracts were part of a 
sequence of repeat contracts. That is, the documents would specify that 
they were borrowing pursuant to a document filed with the SEC for an 
earlier deal. In total, there were 12 such sequences for private company 
transactions with a mean of 9.1 contracts per sequence. In each of the 12 
sequences, the initial indenture contract contained the Old clause and all 
subsequent repeat contracts copied this same clause. A similar pattern 
exists for the public company transactions. Out of the 322 public company 
transactions, 123 were part of a sequence of repeat contracts. In total, there 
were 24 such sequences with a mean of 5.2 contracts per sequence. As 
with the private company transactions, the initial contract in a sequence 
used the Old Clause and all subsequent repeat contracts also used the same 
clause. 
Because of the extreme stickiness in sequences of repeat contracts, 
the presence of the repeat contracts may mask changes in one-and-done 
and initial contracts in a sequence of contracts. To examine the contracts 
where we expect changes to happen, we remove all repeat contracts in 
sequences of contracts other than the first contract in the sequence. This 
left us with 216 contracts for private company transactions (with 204 one-
and-done contracts and 12 initial contracts for a sequence) and 221 
contracts for public company transactions (with 197 one-and-done 
contracts and 24 initial contracts for a sequences). 
Figures 3 and 4 graph the mix of No Recourse clauses by year for 
private company and public company transactions excluding repeat 
contracts other than the initial contract in the sequence. Note that even 
without repeat contracts, the Old clause remains the majority clause for 
transactions in all years for public company transactions. In comparison, 
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the shift away from the Old clause and toward the Modified and New 
clauses is even more pronounced for private company transactions once 
the repeat contracts are removed. Without the repeat contracts, from 2012 
onward the New or Modified clause is present in 71.4% of the private 
company transactions compared with 34.9% of the public company 
transactions (chi-squared test of the difference is significant at the 1%  
confidence level).  
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To focus more intently on the separate importance of lawyer-side 
agency costs, we split the private company deals between those with a top 
private equity law firm present in the deal and those without such a law 
firm. We define a top private equity law firm as a law firm ranked as one 
of the top 5 private equity law firms by Vault in 2020.63 These firms 
included Kirkland & Ellis LLP, Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP, Latham 
& Watkins LLP, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP, and 
Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP. We predict that a top private equity law 
firm will have the economies of scale and incentive to invest as a “spider” 
in coordinating the network of lawyers to developing a new standard No 
Recourse clause and in recommending this term to clients in private 
company deals. 
We compare the mix of No Recourse clauses over time for one-and-
done contracts (including the first contract in a sequence of contracts) for 
private company transactions that did and did not involve a top private 
equity law firm. Many of the transactions involved multiple law firms. We 
defined a transaction as involving a top private equity law firm if at least 
one of the firms involved in the transaction was one of the top five ranked 
firms by Vault in 2020. 
 
 63.  See Best Law Firms for Private Equity, VAULT, https://www.vault.com/best-
companies-to-work-for/law/best-law-firms-in-each-practice-area/private-equity 
[https://perma.cc/73MX-SU7M]. We assume that the top five firms in the 2020 Vault 
ranking were among the top private equity firms throughout our sample time period from 
2005 to 2019. We also ran the tests using the ranking of top five firms from Chambers and 
Partners, which uses a different method of ranking (client surveys, as opposed to law 
student surveys). In that ranking, Clifford Chance LLP and Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP 
replace Skadden, Arps, Meagher & Flom LLP and Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP. For the 
latest Chambers ranking, as of this writing, see 
https://chambers.com/guide/global?publicationTypeId=2&practiceAreaId=775&subsecti
onTypeId=1&locationId=225 [https://perma.cc/R7P3-68BS]. The results were essentially 
the same. There are other rankings of the top law firms as well that invariably list the same 
set of firms in their top categories, such as US News.  
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Figure 5 depicts the mix of different No Recourse clauses by year for 
one-and-done and the initial contract in a sequence of contracts for private 
company deals involving at least one top private equity law firm. Note 
from the figure that from 2012 onward, the Modified or New clause 
dominates in the market. From 2014 onward, no private equity deal 
involving a top private equity law firm uses the Old clause. There is a 
100% shift away from the Old clause. 
In comparison, we depict the mix of No Recourse clauses by year for 
one-and-done contracts and the initial contract in a sequence of contracts 
for private company deals without any top private equity law firm in 
Figure 6. While there is a shift away from the Old clause toward the 
Modified and New clauses from 2012 onward, note that the Old clause is 
still used frequently in deals through the end of our dataset in mid-2019. 
Indeed, in 2015 and 2016, the Old clause is the majority clause in the 
market. From 2010 onward, the New or Modified clause is present in 
82.0% of the private company transactions with a top private equity law 
firm compared with only 56.0% of the private company transactions 
without a top private equity law firm (chi-squared test of the difference is 
significant at the 1% confidence level). Our evidence indicates that the 
presence of a top ranked private equity law firm is correlated with a much 
higher rate of change away from the Old clause and toward the New or 
Modified clause after the 2008 Financial Crisis shock. 
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IV. IMPLICATIONS  
This preliminary study was designed to advance our understanding of 
the ways that agency costs might affect contract term stickiness in 
boilerplate commercial transactions. To that end, we sought to examine 
the impact of overall agency costs on the rate of change of boilerplate 
contract terms by comparing public company deals, a context with high 
agency costs, with private company deals, a context with low agency costs. 
We also isolated the effects of lawyer-side agency costs by comparing 
private company deals with a top five private equity attorney and deals 
without such an attorney. 
Our prior work in sovereign debt contracting showed that a key 
source of agency costs was the reluctance of agents—the bankers, debt 
managers, and lawyers—to act unilaterally to revise boilerplate terms that 
were accepted as the standard form in a large multilateral market. This 
first-mover disadvantage stemmed from concern that any revision might 
be viewed as idiosyncratic in the market and thus, by increasing learning 
costs, increase the front-end costs of issuing the debt transaction. 
Moreover, idiosyncrasy increases the risk of misinterpretation by courts as 
well as the risk of a negative signal. In the current study, the risk of that 
same idiosyncrasy may have deterred revisions to No Recourse terms in 
new contracts that might then have resulted in the failure of contracts 
containing the old language to insulate parties from liability. The evidence 
here shows that important revisions to the standard boilerplate did not 
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occur widely until the relevant actors were able to coordinate on a global 
change that the market could accept as the new standard. 
  Our current study, while preliminary, offers evidence that 
coordination in loosely organized networks, such as networks of 
transactional lawyers, is facilitated to the extent that there is a “spider in 
the web”—a controlling entity or hierarchy at the center of the network 
that facilitates network formation and maintains stability.64 Here we have 
evidence that supports the coordinating function of the spider in the web. 
With the caveat that we can show only correlation, not causation, a series 
of continuing education/bar association sessions at which an eminent 
senior lawyer advocated for a revision of a contract term, supported by the 
publication of an article in a widely circulated journal seems to have been 
key in inducing change. Further, the biggest and fastest changes in the 
boilerplate occurred in deals where the top law firms in the industry were 
involved. The large law firms that dominate the private equity market 
appear to have functioned much more effectively to coordinate the 
changes to the No Recourse clause that better protected their clients’ 
interests than did lawyers representing public companies who operated 
without the benefit of a coordinating spider. 
Noteworthy here is that none of the lawyers we spoke to in the context 
of this project, including the lawyer whose efforts seem to have been 
instrumental in inducing change, predicted what we found. They 
speculated that either the SunGard and Neiman Marcus transactions or the 
2008 financial crisis might have been the catalysts for significant change 
in the market. As an aside, none of our respondents thought that the case 
law we cite was likely to induce change in drafting practices—contrary to 
what the standard legal and economic theory would predict. 
The relevance of the spider in coordinating revisions to inefficient 
boilerplate can be observed in other settings as well. Returning to the 
sovereign bond market: if the market participants had acted together, they 
could have overcome many of the reasons for inertia noted earlier. But 
coordinating the efforts of participants in multilateral markets to create a 
functioning network is challenging. To be sure, some multilateral markets 
deploy mechanisms—whether in the form of a master contract as in the 
case of franchises or a bureaucratic structure in the case of trade 
associations—that support network collaborations.65 But the sovereign 
 
 64.  Porat & Scott, supra note 58, at 15–16; Robert E. Scott, The Paradox of 
Contracting in Markets, 100 LAW & CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS (forthcoming 2020), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3561705. 
 65.  See e.g., Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: 
Creating Cooperation Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724 
(2001); Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code’s Search 
for Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765, 1771–77 (1996) (discussing rules 
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bond market, as well perhaps as the corporate bond market we study here, 
lack any centralizing spider to mandate changes in contract language.66 On 
the contrary, as our data show, the private equity market, particularly 
where a top law firm is involved in a deal, is more analogous to the case 
of the market for derivatives, where the ISDA Determination Committees 
serve as the spider organizing regular updating of terms in the master 
contract.67 
CONCLUSION 
We emphasize once more that the results of this preliminary study are 
only suggestive. Despite these caveats, we conclude with two claims. First, 
the issues raised by the existence of large law firms as a possible 
coordination mechanism in connection with lawyer networks deserve a 
more prominent place in legal scholarship. Second, the evidence simply 
cannot be ignored that coordination difficulties are an important part of the 
explanation of why standard terms in large market commercial contracts 
are slow to change in response to significant external shocks. The demand 
for an increased scholarly focus on the nature and extent of network 
solutions to the problems of sticky contract terms is justified by the 




of the National Grain and Feed Association, which requires that all disputes among 
members must be submitted to the Association’s arbitration system). 
 66.  Failure of coordination is the best explanation of why no changes in contract 
language occurred in the case of Argentina’s sovereign debt for over three years after the 
Second Circuit Court of Appeals had issued an interpretation that put all future efforts to 
restructure the Argentine bonds at risk. The individual interests of the key market 
participants were inconsistent with their collective interests. Any revision to the clause at 
issue—the pari passu clause that was interpreted to foreclose a restructuring of Argentina’s 
debt—had to be “settled” among the key parties, since the market demanded “standard” 
legal terms that minimized the ex-ante costs of placing the bonds in the market. 
Coordination did not occur, therefore, until a conference at Columbia Law School in early 
October 2014 gathered the key parties together. The Columbia meeting appeared to make 
clear to those present that coordination attempts were not proceeding smoothly, and the 
result was a subsequent meeting of the key players at the offices of the New York Federal 
Reserve Bank at which coordination did occur. For further discussion, see Stephen J. Choi, 
Mitu Gulati & Robert E. Scott, Contractual Arbitrage in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE (Jerome Sgard et al. eds. 2020) (forthcoming). 
 67.  Thus, for example, the ISDA Master Contract is updated frequently by the 
International Swaps and Derivatives Association. The ISDA Determination Committees 
are a central authority with power to endorse and update the terms in derivative contracts, 
empowered to make official, binding determinations regarding the existence of “credit 
events” and “succession events” (such as mergers), which may trigger obligations under 
a credit default swap contract. See Scott, supra note 64, at n.21. 
